One of the challenges Gen John P. Jumper, chief of staff of the Air Force, sends to Air Force students, researchers, and staff offices is to investigate future concepts of operations (CONOPS). One in particular relates to this study, the CONOPS for space and command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The Air Force is very sensitive about incorporating new technology into its operations. While the authors advocate a feas...

The initial question of this study concerns the debate between those who believe in a general Islamic threat, as defined most eloquently by Samuel P. Huntington in The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, and others who see a small band of religious fanatics who have hijacked Islam from the moderate majority. This question about the source of terrorism has importance to the major Islamic nations as it does for Latin American countries, where Muslims...

In the 53-year history of the United States Air Force (USAF), only two airmen have risen to serve as regional commanders in chief (CINC). During the same period, 74 soldiers, sailors, and Marines were selected for geographic CINC billets. In Once in a Blue Moon: Airmen in Theater Command, Lt Col Howard D. Belote examines the reasons for this disparity and suggests how airmen might improve their prospects for becoming future regional commanders.

This study investigates Europe’s motives to develop the independent satellite navigation system known as Galileo despite the existence of America’s successful global positioning system (GPS). The study begins by analyzing both systems to familiarize the reader with global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) and to provide an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of GPS and Galileo, as well as the systems’ similarities and differences. Although the two systems h...

The importance of combat effects in warfare has no second. However, most combat effects would never be delivered without crucial information delivered from combat support forces. In this time of turbulent recapitalization and reorganization within the Air Force, the critical nature of combat and combat support effects must remain foremost in our decisions as we create new commands, place people and resources where needed, and forecast budgets.

During the Cold War, the Air Force had a fairly easy time explaining its mission to the American public. It also had a coherent public affairs structure to help execute that mission. The new threat environment in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, combined with steep personnel cuts to its public affairs community, have dramatically altered the communication challenge for the Air Force. To effectively operate in this new climate with an emphasis on strategic communicati...

Lt Col Clint Hinote looks at recent combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, interested particularly with the operational intersection of air and ground forces. He discovered a continuing dialog about one of the Air Force’s major tenets—centralized control, decentralized execution. He suggests that all parties, both ground and air advocates, may need to reexamine the purpose and application of this doctrinal point.

This British historian, David Hall, found relevant cross-service problems in Afghanistan during recent British air-ground operations. He was stricken by the similarities with British airground operations during World War II when the Royal Air Force and the British Army first struggled with doctrinal air support practices.

Technical innovation lies at the heart of the case for privileging airpower in the American way of war, but such innovation comprises only one of warfare’s seven vital contexts. The sheer complexity of war and warfare renders prediction, technological and other, a high-risk activity. The contexts of war and warfare are (1) political, (2) societal-cultural, (3)economic, (4) technological, (5) military-strategic, (6) geographical, and (7) historical.

Professor Gray identifies and discusses nine fallacies that: (1) the USAF should abandon large-scale regular warfare; (2) airpower is inherently a strategic weapon; (3) airpower is driven by technology rather than ideas; (4) airpower is about targeting; (5) airpower must be subordinate to land power; (6) the theory of strategic airpower is flawed; (7) an independent USAF interferes with an effective joint force structure; (8) airpower is a minor player in counterinsurgen...

Is America’s counterinsurgency (COIN) effort being shortchanged? Does a one-dimensional doctrine fail to exploit America’s full COIN potential? Would a genuinely joint approach provide better options to decision makers confronted with the harsh realities of twenty-first century insurgencies? This study insists the answers are unequivocally “yes.” It analyzes the pitfalls of accepting Army/Marine tactical doctrine as the joint solution. It also offers insights and ideas ...

None before Prof. John Norton Moore has argued the value of democratic principles in deterrence and conflict avoidance. In this important book, Dr. Gary Sharp analyzes the concepts in Moore’s seminal work The War Puzzle (2005), which describes Moore’s incentive theory of war avoidance. Sharp carefully dissects Moore’s deterrence model and examines those incentives that discourage nondemocratic governments from pursuing violent conflicts. Arguing that existing democracie...

To lead the US Air Force into the future, it is necessary to understand the past and present nature of the force. With this in mind, Air Force leaders have always sought to arm members of the force with a basic knowledge and understanding of Air Force culture and history. This volume is a contribution to that ongoing educational process, but as the title states, this is only an introduction. The information provided here merely scratches the surface of the fascinatin...

This is a book about strategy and war fighting in the midst of a revolution in military affairs as the world moves into the twenty-first century. The book's purpose is to focus attention on the operational problems, enemy strategies, and threats that will confront US national security decision makers in the twenty-first century. The participating authors are either professional military officers or civilian professionals who specialize in national security issues.

Interagency Fratricide: Policy Failures in the Persian Gulf and Bosnia provides a comprehensive analysis of the factors that affected both interagency processes and policy outcomes during the Persian Gulf War (1990–91) and the early stages of the Bosnia crisis (1993–95). Going one-on-one with members of Washington’s policy elite who were involved directly in these two cases, the author demonstrates that the US government’s approach to termination policy proved fragmen...

Snow’s and Drew’s newest version has been slightly retitled and almost totally rewritten to reflect radically changed politicalmilitary realities. Making Twenty-First-Century Strategy addresses not only traditional strategy concerns but also the chaotic nature of the post–Cold War world and the stark realities of terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and military conflicts along religious fault lines. Although the authors have changed a great deal in this edition, the orig...

ANZUS is a defense alliance, a special and functional relationship between three close allies-Australia, New Zealand, and the United States .

At its core this work is a database covering Anglo-American strategic bomber operations against Germany, Italy, and Axis associated or occupied Europe. As such it allows swift and easy listing of day-by-day bombing, bombing of strategic target systems by location and tonnage, bombing of specific countries, comparisons of US and British targeting and operations, and much more.