Crs Report for Congress Received through the Crs Web Globalizing Cooperative Threat Reduction : A Survey of Options January 27, 2005

By Squassoni, Sharon A.

Book Id: WPLBN0000001846
Format Type: PDF eBook:
File Size: 0.2 MB
Reproduction Date: 2008

Title:	Crs Report for Congress Received through the Crs Web Globalizing Cooperative Threat Reduction : A Survey of Options January 27, 2005
Author:	Squassoni, Sharon A.
Volume:
Language:	English
Subject:	Government publications, Legislation., Government Printing Office (U.S.)
Collections:	Government Library Collection
Historic Publication Date:
Publisher:	Government Printing Office


Citation APA MLA Chicago A. Squasson, B. S. (n.d.). Crs Report for Congress Received through the Crs Web Globalizing Cooperative Threat Reduction : A Survey of Options January 27, 2005. Retrieved from http://gutenberg.cc/

Excerpt
Summary: Increasingly, Congress and the Bush Administration are looking to utilize nonproliferation assistance programs, including cooperative threat reduction, to help reduce the risk of terrorist access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In the FY2004 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 108-176, Sec. 1308), Congress authorized the Bush Administration to spend $50 million of unobligated funds from the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program in states outside the former Soviet Union. As of January 2005, the Administration had spent such funds only in Albania for the purpose of eliminating chemical weapons stockpiles. The report of the 9/11 Commission called for continued support for threat reduction assistance to keep WMD away from terrorist groups. This report, which will be updated as needed, analyzes the range of possible applications of CTR funds, the kinds of assistance that might be supplied, and describes legal, financial, technical, and political constraints on possible assistance.

Table of Contents
Contents Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Connecting CTR and WMD Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Congressional Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 The Threat: Nexus of WMD and Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 State Sponsors of Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Cuba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Libya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 North Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Sudan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Syria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 States with Terrorist Activity and WMD Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 How Significant Is the Nexus? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Cooperative Threat Reduction Program as Precedent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Kinds of Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Weapons Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Site Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Material Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Personnel Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Tailoring Assistance to Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Tier I: North Korea and Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Tier II: Cuba, Libya, Sudan, and Syria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Tier III: States with WMD Capabilities and Terrorist Activities on their Soil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Constraints on Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Political Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Technical Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Legal Constraints: Treaty Obligations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Legal Constraints: Nonproliferation and Anti-Terrorism Laws . . . . . . . . . . 29 Nonproliferation Laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Anti-terrorism Laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Nuclear Cooperation/nuclear Weapons Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Dual-Use Exports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Costs and Benefits of Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .