Proliferation: Threat and Response

Book Id: WPLBN0000124817
Format Type: PDF eBook
File Size: 4.9 MB
Reproduction Date: 2008

Title:	Proliferation: Threat and Response
Author:
Volume:
Language:	English
Subject:	Government publications, Legislation., Government Printing Office (U.S.)
Collections:	Government Library Collection
Historic Publication Date:
Publisher:	Government Printing Office


Citation APA MLA Chicago Proliferation: Threat and Response. (n.d.). Proliferation: Threat and Response. Retrieved from http://gutenberg.cc/

Excerpt
Excerpt: Message of the Secretary of Defense: At the dawn of the 21st Century, the United States now faces what could be called a Superpower Paradox. Our unrivaled supremacy in the conventional military arena is prompting adversaries to seek unconventional, asymmetric means to strike what they perceive as our Achilles heel. At least 25 countries now possess- or are in the process of acquiring and developing- capabilities to inflict mass casualties and destruction: nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons or the means to deliver them. For example: North Korea is building and selling long-range missiles, has chemical and biological warfare capabilities, and may have diverted fissile material for nuclear weaponry. Iran, with foreign assistance, is buying and developing longer-range missiles, already has chemical weapons, and is seeking nuclear and biological capabilities. Iraq- which prior to the 1991 Gulf War had developed chemical and biological weapons and associated delivery means, and was close to a nuclear capability- may have reconstituted these efforts since the departure of UN inspectors from Iraq in late 1998.

Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 SECTION I—NBC PROLIFERATION CHALLENGES NBC PROLIFERATION CHALLENGES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 New Suppliers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Improved Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 NBC Use and Asymmetric Military Strategic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 EAST ASIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 U.S. Goals and Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Capabilities, Intentions, and Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 North Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 China. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 SOUTH ASIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 U.S. Goals and Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Capabilities, Intentions, and Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Pakistan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 U.S. Goals and Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Capabilities, Intentions, and Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Syria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Libya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Sudan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 RUSSIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 U.S. Goals and Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 Capabilities, Intentions, and Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 TRANSNATIONAL THREATS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 U.S. Goals and Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61