Verification Technology: Unclassified Version

By Drell, S.

Book Id: WPLBN0000138691
Format Type: PDF eBook:
File Size: 5.89 MB
Reproduction Date: 2008

Title:	Verification Technology: Unclassified Version
Author:	Drell, S.
Volume:
Language:	English
Subject:	Government publications, Legislation., Government Printing Office (U.S.)
Collections:	Government Library Collection
Historic Publication Date:
Publisher:	Government Printing Office


Citation APA MLA Chicago Drell, B. S. (n.d.). Verification Technology: Unclassified Version. Retrieved from http://gutenberg.cc/

Excerpt
Introduction: This study analyzes several of the principal new challenges to effective verification of compliance to agreed limits to weapons now under discussion at the START negotiations. The new requirements are analyzed, new technologies are described, and specific proposals are presented for enhancing our capabilities to verify treaty compliance.

Table of Contents
Contents 1 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 1 1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.2 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 ADVANCED CONVENTIONAL AIR-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES 7 2.1 General Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.2 Distinguishability of an Advanced CCM . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.3 Non- convertibility of an Advanced CCM . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 2.3.1 Tentpole Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2.3.2 Inner Shell Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 2.3.3 Honeycomb Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 2.3.4 Verification Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 2.4 How Small a Nuclear Warhead? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 2.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 3 SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE VERIFICATION 29 3.1 General Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 3.2 Characteristics of SLCMs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 3.3 Problems SLCMs Pose for Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 3.4 Verification Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 3.5 Verification Regimes for Two Hypothetical Treaty Limits on SLCMs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 3.5.1 Verification of a Treaty Banning Nuclear SLCMs of All Ranges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 3.5.2 Verification of a Treaty with Separate Sublimits on Nuclear and Conventional Long-Range SLCMs . . . . . . 54 3.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 4 A FORMAL DIALOGUE (PQC) TO ASSIST VERIFICATION OF MOBILE LAND BASED MISSILES 6 1 4.1 Application of PQC to Reservations on which Mobile ICBMs are Deployed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 4.2 Extension of PQC to Nationwide Partitions . . . . . . . . . . 69