Crs Report for Congress Received through the Crs Web U. S. Army's Modular Redesign : Issues for Congress Updated February 10, 2005

By Feickert, Andrew

Book Id: WPLBN0000142984
Format Type: PDF eBook
File Size: 0.2 MB
Reproduction Date: 2008

Title:	Crs Report for Congress Received through the Crs Web U. S. Army's Modular Redesign : Issues for Congress Updated February 10, 2005
Author:	Feickert, Andrew
Volume:
Language:	English
Subject:	Government publications, Legislation., Government Printing Office (U.S.)
Collections:	Government Library Collection
Historic Publication Date:
Publisher:	Government Printing Office


Citation APA MLA Chicago Feickert, A. (n.d.). Crs Report for Congress Received through the Crs Web U. S. Army's Modular Redesign : Issues for Congress Updated February 10, 2005. Retrieved from http://gutenberg.cc/

Excerpt
Summary: In what the Army describes as the “most significant Army restructuring in the past 50 years,” the Army intends to redesign its current 10 active duty division force to a 43 or 48 brigade-level unit of action or UA force by FY2007. The Army National Guard will also redesign its force structure in a similar fashion. While the Army cites the need for a more responsive, deployable, joint, and expeditionary force, others suggest that the primary reason for redesign is the ever increasing long term troop requirements to support the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The addition of up to 15 additional active duty and a yet to be finalized number of Army National Guard brigade-sized UAs could provide an additional force pool of deployable units to ease the burden on units presently deployed, and possibly to shorten the length of time that units are deployed on operations. The Army has two other concurrent initiatives underway which it considers inextricably linked to its brigade-centric redesign -- restructuring to create new “high demand” units and stabilizing the force. Both initiatives involve substantial policy, organizational, and personnel changes from FY2004 -- FY2009.

Table of Contents
Contents Issues For Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Why Redesign the Army? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 History of Brigade-Sized Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 The Army’s Objective Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 The Current State of the Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 How the Army is Organized . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Where the Army is Committed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 The Proposed Modular Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 From Objective Force to Future Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 How the Units Will Be Redesigned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Supporting Units of Action Redesign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 What Will the Brigade Units of Action Look Like? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Armored UA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Infantry UA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCTs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Capability Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Deployability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Lethality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Jointness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Creation of Additional Deployable Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 When Will These Units Be Developed? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 What Additional Manpower Will Be Required? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 What Additional Equipment Will be Required? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Where Will These Units be Located? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Restructuring and Stabilizing the Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Other Critical Army Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Restructuring the Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Stabilizing the Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Cost Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Oversight Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Necessity of Redesign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Adequacy of Plans and Cost Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 National Guard and Army Reserve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Supporting Units of Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Future Combat System (FCS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Restructuring and Stabilizing the Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Basing the Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Active Duty Personnel and Equipment Shortages . .