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European Union's Arms Embargo on China : Implications and Options for U. S. Policy

By Kan, Shirley A.

Book Id: WPLBN0000172035
Format Type: PDF eBook
File Size: 0.2 MB
Reproduction Date: 2008

Title:	European Union's Arms Embargo on China : Implications and Options for U. S. Policy
Author:	Kan, Shirley A.
Volume:
Language:	English
Subject:	Government publications, Legislation., Government Printing Office (U.S.)
Collections:	Government Library Collection
Historic Publication Date:
Publisher:	Government Printing Office


Citation APA MLA Chicago Kan, S. A. (n.d.). European Union's Arms Embargo on China : Implications and Options for U. S. Policy. Retrieved from http://gutenberg.cc/

Excerpt
Summary: The European Union (EU) is considering lifting its arms embargo on China, which was imposed in response to the June 1989 Tiananmen Crackdown. France, Germany, and other EU members claim that the embargo hinders the development of a “strategic partnership” with China. The Bush Administration and Members of Congress strongly oppose an end to the EU’s arms embargo and urge stronger arms export controls. The United States contends that engagement with China need not send the wrong signals on China’s human rights record and military buildup that threatens a peaceful resolution of Taiwan and other Asian issues.

Table of Contents
Contents Background: Policy Dilemmas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Congressional Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Decisions on Arms Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 U.S. Sanctions on Arms Sales to China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 EU’s Arms Embargo on China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Current Status: PRC Pressure on the EU to End Embargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Administration’s Position on the Embargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 China’s Accelerated Military Buildup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Rising Military Budgets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Military-related Transfers to China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Potential Benefits for China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 EU’s Perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Political Motivations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Commercial Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 A Symbolic Embargo? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Code of Conduct and Arms Export Control Regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 EU’s Plans and Other Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Implications for U.S. Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Transatlantic Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 U.S. Policy Toward China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Options for U.S. Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Continue to Urge the EU to Maintain its Arms Embargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Encourage the EU to Strengthen its Code of Conduct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Promote a Cooperative U.S.-EU Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Pursue Robust Bilateral Efforts on European Arms Exports . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Engage with the European Parliament . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Retaliate to Protect U.S. National Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Appendix: Non-Russian Military-related Transfers to China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 List of Tables Table 1: China’s Acquisitions under Reported Contracts for Military-related Systems from Europe (Excluding Russia), Israel, and Others Since the 1990s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Table 2: China’s Reported Negotiations for Military-related Systems from Non-Russian Sources Since the 1990s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40