Crs Report for Congress Received through the Crs Web Iran : U. S. Concerns and Policy Responses Updated April 15, 2005

By Katzman, Kenneth

Book Id: WPLBN0000173102
Format Type: PDF eBook:
File Size: 0.3 MB
Reproduction Date: 2008

Title:	Crs Report for Congress Received through the Crs Web Iran : U. S. Concerns and Policy Responses Updated April 15, 2005
Author:	Katzman, Kenneth
Volume:
Language:	English
Subject:	Government publications, Legislation., Government Printing Office (U.S.)
Collections:	Government Library Collection
Historic Publication Date:
Publisher:	Government Printing Office


Citation APA MLA Chicago Katzman, B. K. (n.d.). Crs Report for Congress Received through the Crs Web Iran : U. S. Concerns and Policy Responses Updated April 15, 2005. Retrieved from http://gutenberg.cc/

Excerpt
Summary: The Bush Administration has pursued several avenues to attempt to contain or end the potential threat posed by Iran, at times pursuing limited engagement, and at other times leaning toward pursuing efforts to change Iran’s regime. Some experts believe a potential crisis is looming over Iran’s nuclear program because the Bush Administration is skeptical that efforts by several European allies to prevent a nuclear breakout by Iran will succeed, although the Administration announced steps in March 2005 to support those talks. Some advocate military action against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, but others believe that a combination of diplomatic and economic rewards and punishment are the only viable options on the nuclear issue. U.S. sanctions currently in effect ban or strictly limit U.S. trade, aid, and investment in Iran and penalize foreign firms that invest in Iran’s energy sector, but unilateral U.S. sanctions do not appear to have materially slowed Iran’s WMD programs to date...

Table of Contents
Contents Threat Assessments and U.S. Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Political History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Regime Stability, Internal Politics, and Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Mohammad Khatemi, Reformists, and Reformist Candidates . . . . . . . 2 The Hardliners, Rafsanjani, and Hardline Candidates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Prominent Dissidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Anti-Regime Groups: People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Pro-Shah Activists/Exile Broadcasts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Human Rights Record/Crackdowns on Dissent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Iran’s Strategic Capabilities and Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs . . 8 Nuclear Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Chemical and Biological Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Foreign Policy and Support for Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Persian Gulf States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Supporting Anti-Peace Process Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Relations With Central Asia and the Caspian . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Afghanistan/Al Qaeda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 U.S. Policy Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Bush Administration Policy and Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Regime Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Engagement? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Military Action? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 International Sanctions? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 U.S. Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Terrorism/Foreign Aid Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Bam Earthquake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Proliferation Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Counternarcotics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Trade Ban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA)/Regional Oil and Gas Deals . . 31 Caspian/Central Asian Energy Routes Through Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Travel-Related Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 U.S.-Iran Assets Disputes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Multilateral Policies Toward Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 EU-Iran Trade Negotiations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Country-Specific Policies: Britain and France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Japan/Azadegan Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Multilateral/International Lending to Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .