China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles : Policy Issues

By Department of National Security

Book Id: WPLBN0000662452
Format Type: PDF eBook
File Size: 221,757 KB.
Reproduction Date: 2005

Title:	China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles : Policy Issues
Author:	Department of National Security
Volume:
Language:	English
Subject:	Government Reference Publication, Transportation., Transportation Administrative Service Center (U.S.)
Collections:	National Security Archive Collection
Historic Publication Date:
Publisher:	Transportation Security Administration


Citation APA MLA Chicago National Security, D. O. (n.d.). China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles : Policy Issues. Retrieved from http://gutenberg.cc/

Excerpt
Congress has long been concerned about whether U.S. policy advances the U.S. interest in reducing the role of the People?s Republic of China (PRC) in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles and obtaining China?s cooperation in weapons nonproliferation. This problem refers to the threat of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and missiles that could deliver them. Some have argued that certain PRC transfers violated international treaties or guidelines, and/or have contravened various U.S. laws requiring sanctions to shore up those international standards. Even if no laws or treaties are violated, many view China?s transfers as threatening U.S. security interests. Using a variety of unclassified consultations and sources, this CRS Report discusses the national security problem of the PRC?s role in weapons proliferation and issues related to the U.S. policy response, including legislation, since the mid-1990s. Table 1, at the end of this report, summarizes the U.S. sanctions imposed or waived on PRC entities or the PRC government for weapons proliferation. For a discussion of the policy problem in the 1980s to 1996, see CRS Report 96-767, Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Background and Analysis, by Shirley Kan. See also, by the same author, CRS Report 98-485, China: Possible Missile Technology Transfers Under U.S. Satellite Export Policy ? Actions and Chronology.

Table of Contents
Contents Purpose and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 PRC Proliferation Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Nonproliferation Commitments but Continued Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Nuclear Technology Sales to Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Ring Magnets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Other Nuclear Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 A. Q. Khan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Missile Technology Sales to Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 M-11 Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Missile Plants and MRBMs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Nuclear Technology Sales to Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 1997 Promise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Uranium Enrichment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Referral to U.N. Security Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Missile Technology Sales to Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Ballistic Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Chemical Sales to Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 North Korea?s Missile and Nuclear Weapons Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Suspected Missile Supplies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Secret Nuclear Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 PRC Ports and Airspace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Trilateral and Six-Party Talks in Beijing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Missile Technology Sales to Libya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Missile Technology Sales to Syria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Missile Technology Sales to Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Policy Issues and Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Issues for Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 The PRC Government?s Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Foreign and Defense Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Summits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Counter-Terrorism Campaign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Missile Defense, Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Export Control Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Linkage to the Taiwan Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Economic Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Satellite Exports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Sanctions and the ?Helms Amendment? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Capital Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Nuclear Cooperation and U.S. Export of Reactors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 U.S. Import Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 U.S. Export Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Nonproliferation and Arms Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Nonproliferation Regimes (MTCR, NSG, etc.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 CTBT and Fissile Materials Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40