Land-Based Airpower in Third World Crises

By Dr. David R. Mets

Book Id: WPLBN0002170172
Format Type: PDF eBook:
File Size: 12.60 MB
Reproduction Date: 10/11/2012

Title:	Land-Based Airpower in Third World Crises
Author:	Dr. David R. Mets
Volume:
Language:	English
Subject:	Non Fiction, Military Science, Third World Countries
Collections:	Authors Community, History
Historic Publication Date:
Publisher:	Air University Press

Member Page:	Air University Press
Citation APA MLA Chicago David R. Met, B. D. (n.d.). Land-Based Airpower in Third World Crises. Retrieved from http://gutenberg.cc/

Description
The third world continues to grow in its importance to the United States . Often possessing a wealth of vital natural resources or a geographic position astride crucial lines of communications, third world nations have, in many cases, become the focal point of East-West confrontations . Additionally, the frequent political turmoil and economic crises that plague some of these third world nations often threaten the vital interests of the West . For all of these reasons, it is imperative that we understand the utility and limitations of military power applied to crisis situations in the third world. Land based air power is of particular importance in rapidly developing crises because of its range of action and speed of response . Dr Mets' study focuses on land-based air power in a variety of these situations over the past three decades. Clearly, the subject is important to our understanding of the most effective use of air power. It is also clear that Dr Mets has made a significant contribution to the literature of air power and provides a message that we all should heed .

Table of Contents
1 POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND MILITARY POWER: SOME RELATIONSHIPS . . . . . . . . . .1 Crisis Defined . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Categories and Characteristics of Military Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Land-Based Air Power Capabilities . . . . . . . . 3 Options in Selecting Land-Based AirPower. . . .5 Notes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2 THE THIRD WORLD ANDTHEUNITED STATES: PROBLEMS, ASSUMPTIONS, AND OUTLOOKS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Problems and Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . .12 Blind Alleys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Crises and Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16 Interdependence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Diffusing Advanced Arms to Less-Developed Countries (LDCs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20 Utility of Military Power . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .27 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 3 THEMAYAGUEZ INCIDENT: SIMPLE CRISIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Scenario . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Genesis of Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37 Land-Based Air Power in the Region . . . . . . 39 Gathering Information and Setting Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Formulating Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41 Selecting the Best Option . . . . . . . . . . .43 Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .46 Landings at Koh Tang . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 Retaking the Mayaguez . . . . . . . . . . . .49 Bombing the Mainland . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 Land-Based AirPower and Crisis Resolution. .51 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .59 4 THE BAY OF PIGS INCIDENT: INTERMEDIATE CRISIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 Developing Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .65 Doctrine and the Bay of Pigs Plan . . . . . . . 66 Strategy Making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 Order of Battle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71 Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71 Political Impacts on the Air Plan . . . . . . . . .73 D-1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .73 D-day . . . . . . . . . . . .74 D+ 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .79 D + 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . .85 5 THE YOM KIPPUR WAR: COMPLEX CRISIS .89 Genesis of the Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .89 The Arabs Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 Reversing the Tide on the Golan . . . . . . . . 98 Superpower Information Gathering . . . . . . .99 Superpower Concerns and Incipient Crisis . . 99 Soviet Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .99 American Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .100 ' Conditions for Cease-fire . . . . . . . . . . . .102 Growing Superpower Tensions . . . . . . . . . .103 US Air Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 The Crossing to "Africa .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .108 Kosygin's Emergency Mission to-Cairo . . . .109 Cease-fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110 World Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 6 CRISES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA .. . . . .121 The Congo Crisis, 1960-63 . . . . . . . . . . . 121 Dragon Rouge: The Stanleyville Crisis, 1964 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .125 Shaba I, 1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 Shaba II, 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .137 7 CONCLUSIONS: LIMITATIONS AND CAPABILITIES OF AIR POWER IN THIRD WORLD CRISES . . . . . . . . . . . . .139 Characteristics and Capabilities . . . . . . . . 139 Utility and Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .143 Strategic and Conceptual Implications . . . .149 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY. . . . . . . . . . . . .153 INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .161