Equilibrium Refinement in Dynamic Voting Games

By Sonin, Konstantin

Book Id: WPLBN0002970236
Format Type: PDF eBook :
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Reproduction Date: 2011

Title:	Equilibrium Refinement in Dynamic Voting Games
Author:	Sonin, Konstantin
Volume:	Volume: no.09-26
Language:	English
Subject:	Game theory, Voting
Collections:	American Libraries Collection
Historic Publication Date:	2009
Publisher:	Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics


Citation APA MLA Chicago Konstantin, S. (2009). Equilibrium Refinement in Dynamic Voting Games. Retrieved from http://gutenberg.cc/

Description
Description: We propose two related equilibrium refinements for voting and agenda-setting games. Sequentially Weakly Undominated Equilibrium (SWUE) and Markov Trembling Hand Perfect Equilibrium (MTHPE), and show how these equilibrium concepts eliminate non-intuitive equilibria that arise naturally in dynamic voting games and games in which random or deterministic sequences of agenda-setters make offers to several players. We establish existence of these equilibria in finite and infinite (for MTHPE) games, provide a characterization of the structure of equilibria, and clarify the relationship between the two concepts. Finally, we show how these concepts can be applied in a dynamic model of endogenous club formation. Keywords: voting, agenda-setting games, Markov trembling-hand perfect equilibrium. JEL Classifications: D72, C73

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