Crs Report for Congress Received through the Crs Web Nuclear Threat Reduction Measures for India and Pakistan Updated February 17, 2005

By Squassoni, Sharon A.

Book Id: WPLBN0000001850
Format Type: PDF eBook
File Size: 0.2 MB
Reproduction Date: 2008

Title:	Crs Report for Congress Received through the Crs Web Nuclear Threat Reduction Measures for India and Pakistan Updated February 17, 2005
Author:	Squassoni, Sharon A.
Volume:
Language:	English
Subject:	Government publications, Legislation., Government Printing Office (U.S.)
Collections:	Government Library Collection
Historic Publication Date:
Publisher:	Government Printing Office


Citation APA MLA Chicago Squassoni, S. A. (n.d.). Crs Report for Congress Received through the Crs Web Nuclear Threat Reduction Measures for India and Pakistan Updated February 17, 2005. Retrieved from http://gutenberg.cc/

Excerpt
Summary: Since India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in 1998, there has been a debate on whether the United States should provide assistance in making those weapons safer and more secure. In the wake of September 11, 2001, interest in this kind of assistance has grown for several reasons: the possibility of terrorists gaining access to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons seems higher, the U.S. military is forging new relationships with both Pakistan and India in the war on terrorism, and heightened tension in Kashmir in 2002 threatened to push both states closer to the brink of nuclear war. In October 2001, media reported that the United States was providing assistance to Pakistan to keep its weapons safe, although those reports have not been confirmed. Revelations in 2004 that Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan was selling nuclear technology (and reportedly a nuclear bomb design) to Iran, Libya, and North Korea also helped to renew interest in making, in particular, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program more secure from exploitation. The report of the 9/11 Commission also called for continued support for threat reduction assistance to keep weapons of mass destruction (WMD) away from terrorist groups.

Table of Contents
Contents Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Congressional Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Cooperative Threat Reduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 CTR as Precedent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 CTR’s Critics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 South Asia Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Nuclear Material Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Nuclear Material Safeguards: IAEA Safeguards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Nuclear Weapons Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Personnel Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Nonproliferation Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 U.S. Nonproliferation Laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Current U.S. Nonproliferation Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Constraints on U.S. Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 International Legal Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Domestic Legal Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 The Atomic Energy Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Export Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Technical Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Political Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Policy Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Site Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Material Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Nuclear Weapons Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Personnel Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Certifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Other Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26