European Union's Arms Embargo on China : Implications and Options for U. S. Policy

By Archick, Kristin

Book Id: WPLBN0000100314
Format Type: PDF eBook:
File Size: 0.2 MB
Reproduction Date: 2008

Title:	European Union's Arms Embargo on China : Implications and Options for U. S. Policy
Author:	Archick, Kristin
Volume:
Language:	English
Subject:	Government publications, Legislation., Government Printing Office (U.S.)
Collections:	Government Library Collection
Historic Publication Date:
Publisher:	Government Printing Office


Citation APA MLA Chicago Archick, B. K. (n.d.). European Union's Arms Embargo on China : Implications and Options for U. S. Policy. Retrieved from http://gutenberg.cc/

Excerpt
Background: Policy Dilemmas. The European Union (EU) is considering lifting its arms embargo on the People’s Republic of China (PRC), imposed after the June 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown. Many countries imposed sanctions on China, after Deng Xiaoping and other PRC rulers ordered the military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), to violently suppress peaceful demonstrators in Beijing on June 4, 1989. (Although the killing of demonstrators took place beyond the Tiananmen Square in the capital of Beijing, the crackdown is commonly called the Tiananmen Crackdown in reference to the square that was the focal point of the nation-wide pro-democracy movement.)

Table of Contents
Contents Background: Policy Dilemmas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Congressional Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Decisions on Arms Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 U.S. Sanctions on Arms Sales to China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 EU’s Arms Embargo on China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Current Status: PRC Pressure on the EU to End Embargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Administration’s Position on the Embargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 China’s Accelerated Military Buildup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Rising Military Budgets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Military-Related Transfers to China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Potential Benefits for China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 EU’s Perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Political Motivations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Commercial Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 A Symbolic Embargo? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Code of Conduct and Arms Export Control Regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 EU’s Plans and Other Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Implications for U.S. Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Transatlantic Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 U.S. Policy Toward China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Options for U.S. Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Continue to Urge the EU to Maintain its Arms Embargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Encourage the EU to Strengthen its Code of Conduct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Promote a Cooperative U.S.-EU Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Pursue Robust Bilateral Efforts on European Arms Exports . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Engage with the European Parliament . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Retaliate to Protect U.S. National Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Impose Restrictions on Sales of Defense Articles and Technology to EU Member States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Impose Restrictions on U.S. Military Procurement from EU States . . 35 Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 ITAR Waivers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Defense Procurement Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Resolutions Urging the EU to Keep the Embargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Appendix: Non-Russian Military-Related Transfers to China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36