Research Studies Series Military Airlift and Aircraft Procurement: The Case of the C–5A

By Knaack, Marcelle Size

Book Id: WPLBN0000178595
Format Type: PDF eBook
File Size: 0.7 MB
Reproduction Date: 2008

Title:	Research Studies Series Military Airlift and Aircraft Procurement: The Case of the C–5A
Author:	Knaack, Marcelle Size
Volume:
Language:	English
Subject:	Government publications, Legislation., Government Printing Office (U.S.)
Collections:	Government Library Collection
Historic Publication Date:
Publisher:	Government Printing Office


Citation APA MLA Chicago Knaack, M. S. (n.d.). Research Studies Series Military Airlift and Aircraft Procurement: The Case of the C–5A. Retrieved from http://gutenberg.cc/

Excerpt
Preface: This is the third in a series of research studies- historical works that were not published for various reasons. Yet, the material contained therein was deemed to be of enduring value to Air Force members and scholars. These were minimally edited and printed in a limited edition to reach a small audience that may find them useful. We invite readers to provide feedback to the Air Force History and Museums Program. The author, Marcelle S. Knaack, a member of the Office of Air Force History, undertook the research and writing of this book as a consultant, after she retired. Tragically, she passed away in November 1996, before she completed the manuscript. Her colleague, Bernard C. Nalty, also retired by that time, undertook to complete Ms. Knaack's work. At first glance, the history of the C–5A Galaxy seems to be nothing more than a compilation of contradictions. Ordered under a totally new procurement concept specifically designed to control costs, the C–5A aircraft ended up costing a small fortune. Its purchase in 1965 depended on achieving an initial operational capability no later than 1969, but the transport did not appear in South Vietnam in a truly operational capacity until August 1971. Although built by the Lockheed-Georgia Company, celebrated for its success with military transports like the C–130 Hercules and C–141 Starlifter, the C–5A program from the very start encountered serious technical problems, delays, and exorbitant cost overruns, which combined to trigger several congressional investigations.

Table of Contents
CONTENTS Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix I. Military Airlift and the Evolution of Aircraft Procurement . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Early Procurement Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Post-World War I Promotion of Aircraft Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 The World War II Production Boom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Airlift for Berlin and Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Continuing Wartime Aircraft Procurement Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Reorganizing to Manage Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Contract Changes Add Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Airlift at the Close of the Eisenhower Era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 II. Flexible Response and the Beginning of the C–5A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 The Effects of Flexible Response on Airlift Requirements and Doctrine . . . . . . . 21 The Imprint of Project Forecast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 The Total Package Procurement Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 The C–5A Program Approved . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 The Study of March 1965: Weight and Engines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Weight: A Frustrating Start . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 III. Building the C–5A: Problems and Controversy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 Source Selection Board Proceedings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 Selection: The Low-Cost Bidder Prevails . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 Engine Development: Difficult at Best . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 An Old, Familiar Pattern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 A Tortuous, Downhill Road . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 Playing Hard Ball . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 Catching the Public Eye . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 IV. Settlement of the C–5A Program and Another Procurement Reform . . 73 Money, A Continuous First Priority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 The Unsolved Financial Dilemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 Cutting Losses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 Another Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 Damage Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84