Special National Intelligence Estimate the French Nuclear Weapons Program

By Department of National Security

Book Id: WPLBN0000697344
Format Type: PDF eBook
File Size: 844,466 KB.
Reproduction Date: 2005

Title:	Special National Intelligence Estimate the French Nuclear Weapons Program
Author:	Department of National Security
Volume:
Language:	English
Subject:	Government Reference Publication, Transportation., Transportation Administrative Service Center (U.S.)
Collections:	National Security Archive Collection
Historic Publication Date:
Publisher:	Transportation Security Administration


Citation APA MLA Chicago National Security, D. O. (n.d.). Special National Intelligence Estimate the French Nuclear Weapons Program. Retrieved from http://gutenberg.cc/

Excerpt
THE PROBLEM To estimate the present state and future pace of French programs for nuclear weapons and delivery systems, and their international implications. B. At least until 1969, France will be dependent on a delivery system consisting of 50 Mirage N jet bombers, all of which are to be operational by the end of 1966. Operating alone as a separate national force and without highly sophisticated delivery tactics, this delivery system would be vulnerable to air defense measures which are already available to the Soviet Union, and would be even more vulnerable to the improved air defenses which the USSR will probably have by the end of 1966. On the otlier hand, the Soviet Government probably will regard the Mirage IVs as a meaningful albeit small threat, because it must assume that a few of these aircraft might penetrate its defenses. (Paras. C. Work is also underway on a second delivery system to consist of three nuclear submarines, which under French plans are to become operational in 1969, 1971, and 1973, respectively, and are to be armed with 16 missiles each having a range of 1, 600 n.m. (3, 000 km). We believe, however, that the first French missile firing nuclear submarine will become fully operational at the earliest in 1970, and possibly even later. (Paras. 12, 13) D. The cost of the force de frappe is high and has risen more rapidly than the government expected several years ago, but is within French capabilities. In addition to the strategic nuclear force, the French also plan a large-scale modernization of their conventional arms and equipment, and have indicated that they do not intend total military spending to rise above its present share of gross national product. The growth of the economy will probably be sufficient to support all these objectives, although rising military expenditures may cause some strains.As long as de Gaulle is in power, the French Government will almost certainly continue its nuclear weapons program, and will make whatever sacrifices are necessary in other military or economic sectors. If it became necessary, the French would probably stretch out spending on the modernization of conventional forces rather than hold down outlays on the nuclear strike force. (paras. 16, 22-23)...

Table of Contents
TABLE OF CONTENTS Page THE PROBLEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 CONCLUSIONS.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I DISCUSSION .. . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . 4 I. CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF FRENCH PROGRAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 A. Nuclear Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 B. Delivery System . . . . . . . . :. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 XI. COST AND BURDEN TO THE FRENCH ECONOMY . . . . . . . . . . . 8 111. POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 A. De Gaulle's Justification for the Force de Frappe . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 B. European Support for de Gaulle's Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 C. French reaction to a Nuclear Test Ban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13