A Need to Know : The Role of Air Force Reconnaissance in War Planning, 1945-1953

By John T. Farquhar

Book Id: WPLBN0002170192
Format Type: PDF eBook:
File Size: 1.07 MB
Reproduction Date: 10/12/2012

Title:	A Need to Know : The Role of Air Force Reconnaissance in War Planning, 1945-1953
Author:	John T. Farquhar
Volume:
Language:	English
Subject:	Non Fiction, History of America, Military
Collections:	Authors Community, Philosophy
Historic Publication Date:
Publisher:	Air University Press

Member Page:	Air University Press
Citation APA MLA Chicago T. Farquha, B. J. (n.d.). A Need to Know : The Role of Air Force Reconnaissance in War Planning, 1945-1953. Retrieved from http://gutenberg.cc/

Description
At first glance, strategic aerial reconnaissance appears to be a mere technical tool. The term refers to the use of aircraft to collect strategic intelligence using photographic or electronic means. According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), strategic intelligence refers to “intelligence that is required for the formation of policy and military plans at national and international levels.” Strategic intelligence includes information provided by sources other than aircraft, including naval vessels, ground communications intercept sites, satellites, published literature, defectors, and spies. Because Air Force aircraft provided the bulk of information used by American war plans from 1945 to 1953, this book focuses on the origins of the USAF strategic aerial reconnaissance. Although official JCS publications did not specifically list strategic aerial reconnaissance, the term may be defined as the use of aircraft to gather information necessary to conduct strategic air war, also called strategic air bombardment.

Table of Contents
1 THE ORIGINS OF STRATEGIC AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 2 GROPING IN THE DARK: RECONNAISSANCE BEFORE CONTAINMENT, 1945 –1946 . . . . . . 25 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42 3 FROM CONTAINMENT TO BERLIN: ORGANIZATIONAL STEPS TO FILL INTELLIGENCE GAPS, 1947–1948 . . . . . . . . 49 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 4 STRATEGIC BOMBING QUESTIONED: INTELLIGENCE SHORTFALLS AND WAR PLANS, 1949 –1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124 5 THE TEST: STRATEGIC RECONNAISSANCE IN KOREA, 1950 –1953 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161 6 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174