Planning Airpower Strategies : Enhancing the Capability of Air Component Command Planning Staff

By Major Charles K. Shugg, USAF

Book Id: WPLBN0002170853
Format Type: PDF eBook:
File Size: 0.5 MB
Reproduction Date: 10/24/2012

Title:	Planning Airpower Strategies : Enhancing the Capability of Air Component Command Planning Staff
Author:	Major Charles K. Shugg, USAF
Volume:
Language:	English
Subject:	Non Fiction, Military Science, Airpower
Collections:	Authors Community, United States
Historic Publication Date:
Publisher:	Air University Press

Member Page:	Air University Press
Citation APA MLA Chicago Charles K. Shugg, Usa, B. M. (n.d.). Planning Airpower Strategies : Enhancing the Capability of Air Component Command Planning Staff. Retrieved from http://gutenberg.cc/

Description
This study attempts to determine whether air component commands are capable of developing an effective airpower strategy. It examines US Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF) because of its recent experience in developing and executing a sizable airpower contribution to a theater campaign. The author sets the background by describing CENTAF’s role in the Persian Gulf War theater campaign strategy. The conclusion is that the commander in chief (CINC) of Central Command did not think that CENTAF had an acceptable holistic airpower strategy in August 1990 and therefore requested the assistance of the Air Staff at the Pentagon. Next, the author justifies and describes credible sources for determining the attributes of an effective operational-level airpower strategy. Using this information, he recommends a notional air component commander’s campaign planning organization and describes the individual branch’s responsibilities and products.

Table of Contents
1 USCENTAF’S ROLE IN CENTCOM’SPERSIAN GULF CAMPAIGN STRATEGY . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . 4 2 CREDIBLE SOURCES FOR DETERMININGTHE ATTRIBUTES OF AN EFFECTIVE AIRPOWER STRATEGY . . . . 5 Notes . . . . . 10 3 RECOMMENDED RESPONSIBILITIES ANDPRODUCTS OF AN AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER’SCAMPAIGN PLANNING ORGANIZATION . . . . 11 Notes . . . . . 18 4 REPORT ON USCENTAF PLANNINGSTAFF’S STATUS—EARLY 1995 . . . . . 19 Notes . . . . . 27 5 IMPLICATIONS/SOLUTIONS TO AIR COMPONENTCOMMANDS’ COMBAT PLANNING SHORTFALLS . . . . 29 Notes . . . . . 31 6 CONCLUSION . . . . . 33 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 35