Waging War without Congress First Declaring It

By Erickson, Matt, R.

Book Id: WPLBN0100301741
Format Type: PDF eBook:
File Size: 3.27 MB
Reproduction Date: 7/4/2018

Title:	Waging War without Congress First Declaring It
Author:	Erickson, Matt, R.
Volume:
Language:	English
Subject:	Non Fiction, History of America
Collections:	Authors Community, Politics
Historic Publication Date:	2018
Publisher:	Patriot Corps

Member Page:	Matt Erickson
Citation APA MLA Chicago R. Erickso, B. M. (2018). Waging War without Congress First Declaring It. Retrieved from http://gutenberg.cc/

Description
Waging War without Congress First Declaring It examines American actions involving Korea and Vietnam, which were the first major wars not formally declared as such by Congress. Not all is at it first appears, and Americans interested in understanding how fundamental American principles are summarily ignored by federal officials and members of Congress need to examine critically such actions.

Summary
Waging War without Congress First Declaring It examines the odd phenomenon of American Presidents unilaterally taking the United States to war without Congress first declaring "War." Americans must realize that members of Congress and federal officials have TWO sources of authority--the powers all the States of the Union gave them when they ratified the original Constitution under the Article VII ratification or the changes to the Constitution as ratified amendments under the Article V amendment processes as enumerated AND the local, State-like powers ceded them by the "particular" State of Maryland when that State ceded the lands and governing power for the District of Columbia in 1791. While the powers given by all the States of the Union are few and defined, the powers ceded only by the State of Maryland in conformance with Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the U.S. Constitution are expansive and undefined. Since no local State-like Constitution is therein applicable in the District Seat to outline the allowed powers, members of Congress and federal officials must make up all the State-like powers as they go along. The bottom line is that the States of the Union are prohibited from entering into an agreement or compact with a foreign power by Article I, Section 10, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution, the District of Columbia is NOT a "State." Thus, American Presidents may use that local power ceded only by one State and enter into agreements with foreign powers such as the United Nations without resorting to the treaty powers all the States allowed him by the Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution. Further, only "States" are prohibited from engaging war without actually being invaded or in imminent danger, and the District of Columbia is NOT a "State", so American Presidents may use that power (that is not subject to Republican principles of legislative representation) to engage in war without needing to wait for Congress to declare war under Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the U.S. Constitution.

Excerpt
By the express command of U.N. Participation Act of 1945—enacted by the Congress of the United States of America and signed by American President Harry S. Truman—all pertinent parties understood the American law that the U.N. special agreements “shall be subject to the approval of Congress by appropriate Act or joint resolution.” Legislative Acts and joint resolutions both require approval of both Houses of Congress—the Senate and the House of Representatives—and the signature of the President (unless approved over his veto by two-thirds of both Houses or with his inaction of ten days [while both Houses are still in session] as detailed in Article I, Section 7, Clauses 2 and 3 of the U.S. Constitution). Despite the U.N. Charter specifically stating that “special agreements” (to commit troops and assistance) “shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes,” despite the President’s written assurance that he would “ask the Congress by appropriate legislation to approve” all special agreements, and despite the United States’ “United Nations Participation Act of 1945” saying that the special agreements negotiated by the President are “subject to the approval of the Congress by appropriate Act or joint resolution,” President Truman never sought to negotiate any special agreements with the U.N. Security Council before (or after) sending American troops into Korea. Strictly speaking, since President Truman did not actually seek any special agreements for Congress to consider, however, he did not violate his July 28, 1945 personal guarantee that he would ask Congress to approve all special agreements he in fact sought. Of course, since he didn’t pursue any special agreements, he could not point to the U.N. Charter for support of his actions. He acted unilaterally—he could not have his cake and eat it, too. The United Nations Participation Act of 1945, if nothing else, should make it quite clear that American Presidents cannot commit American troops for U.N. purposes without direct congressional support through ratification of negotiated special agreements. President Truman’s decision to give cover and military support in Korea were his unilateral actions unsupported under the U. N. Therefore, even without challenging any transfer of sovereign American powers to foreign bureaucrats (who are not duly-elected members of Congress or American Presidents meeting the citizenship, residency and oath requirements of the Constitution), President Truman did not have proper authority to commit U.S. troops to Korea under the United Nations Charter. Neither did President Truman have proper authority under the U.S. Constitution, since Congress never declared war on North Korea. Yet, Truman did fight the Korean War—for three long years—with the U.S. suffering 33,739 battle deaths, while therein expending $30 billion (equivalent to $341 billion in 2011 dollars). Since the war was waged, however, President Truman had to have some type of authority to act as he did. This book seeks to expose that authority the President used to wage war of his own accord.