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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING THE ENDURING REQUIREMENTS FOR MILITARY FORCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3 ASSESSING THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF AIRPOWER TO A COERCION STRATEGY . . . .27 4 ASSESSING UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE CONTRIBUTIONS TO A COERCION STRATEGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 5 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69...

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The B-52 and Jet Propulsion: A Case Study in Organizational Innovation is a coherent and nonpolemical discussion of the revolution in military affairs, a hot topic in the national security arena. Mark Mandeles examines an interesting topic, how can the military better understand, manage, and evaluate technological development programs. We see Murphy’s Law (anything that can go wrong, will go wrong) in operation. No matter how carefully the military designs, plans, and programs the process of technological development, inevitably, equipment, organizations, and people will challenge the desired expectations. The book focuses on the introduction of jet propulsion into the B-52. This case study illustrates the reality that surprises and failures are endemic to development programs where information and knowledge are indeterminate, ambiguous, and imperfect....

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Chapter 1 Introduction ................................1 Chapter 2 Innovation and Military Revolutions ..............................................................4 Chapter 3 Logic and Procedure of Analysis ..............................................................17 Chapter 4 Prelude: Jet Propulsion and the Air Force.....................................................29 Chapter 5 The Introduction of Jet Propulsion into the B-52..........................................54 Chapter 6 Conclusion................................99 Table 1 USAF Engine Development Time.....42 Table 2 B-52 TimeLine...............................56 Table 3 Maximum Takeoff Weights and Combat Radii.......................................66 Table 4 XB-52 Performance Requirements..........................................75 Table 5 Boeing Company Comparison of Basic Turbopropand Basic Turbojet Models ...............................87 Appendix XB-52 Program Select Senior Personnel...............................................115...

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Religion and culture in general have been long neglected by planners, policy makers, and diplomats. Our experience in Phase IV, or the constructive phase, of Operation Iraqi Freedom has clearly exposed this inattention as a serious flaw in bringing peaceful development to Iraq. These authors suggest that military chaplains can be a part of a better solution. It is not a case of trying to proselyte; it is rather one of engaging local religious leaders to facilitate the stabilization process....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2 RELIGION IN STABILITY OPERATIONS . . . . .7 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3 CHAPLAINS IN STABILITY OPERATIONS . . 13 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21 4 MODIFICATIONS TO THE CHAPLAIN SERVICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29 5 CONCLUSIONS AND RESPONSES TO POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39...

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1 Do Concepts Matter· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 9 2 Instant Thunder: Why an Air Staff Plan · · 27 3 How Does Airpower Work?· · · · · · · · · · · · 51 4 Knockout Blow? Or Decision on Points? · · ·71 5 The Objective · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·85 6 Taking It to the Enemy· · · · · · · · · · · · · ·97 7 Seizing the High Ground: Airpower as a Maneuver Element? · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 111 8 Setup for the Knockout Blow · · · · · · · · · 127 9 The First Information War · · · · · · · · · · ·145 10 Conclusions: What Is Air (and Space) Power? · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 163 EPILOGUE: A View of the Air Force Today and Tomorrow · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·185 GLOSSARY· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 197 INDEX · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·201...

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . vii PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . xi ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv 1 EXPECTATIONS OF COMMAND . . . 1 What Does the Boss Expect? . . . 2 What Do the Troops Expect? . . . 9 What Do You Expect? . . . . . . . . . 18 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 2 VISION AND ENVIRONMENT . . . . . 23 Developing and Communicating Your Vision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Building the Environment . . . . . 30 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 3 WALKING THE WALK . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 4 HANDLING JUSTICE . . . . . . . . . . . 73 5 GREAT IDEAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 Take Responsibility for Fun . . . . 95 Sponsor Program . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 Celebrate Heroes—Not Machines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 Mentoring Program . . . . . . . . . . 104 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....

Description Details
This book, Guidelines for Command, is the result of countless hours of research and contains the collective thoughts and lessons learned from many previous commanders. It has a wealth of information to assist you during your tenure as a commander. Use it in conjunction with your personal leadership skills, your base’s subject-matter experts, and your fellow commanders to lead our Airmen to new heights....

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A huge portion of the military burden in support of these operations falls on the shoulders of the Mobility Air Forces (MAF). Lt Col Eileen M. Isola’s Leading Air Mobility Operations in Complex Humanitarian Emergencies provides just such an educational foundation for MAF war fighters charged with leading CHEs. She provides a superb synthesis of a dozen years of lessons learned from many resources and institutions, sifting through the tactical and operational lessons learned so as to focus her research into the most important tenets for strategic success in a CHE: build a team of teams, gather and share information (not “intelligence”), and establish centers for interagency success. She reviews key joint and service doctrine manuals, culling critical nuances that would likely be overlooked by war fighters new to the CHE environment, or rushed in a crisis deployment. Her cultural comparison of the military and nongovernmental organizations is insightful and valuable. Throughout her work Colonel Isola provides tangible, real examples from past operations of what worked and what did not—and why. The implications for the future are clear...

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"Setting the Context: Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses and Joint War Fighting in an Uncertain World explains why SEAD has changed the basic fabric of air warfare. In discussing the familiar themes of the past and the emerging paradigms of the future, Colonel Brungess weaves a web of changing interrelationships among services, politico-military structures, and research and development strategies, as well as developing a novel methodology for assessing events critical to air power's future."...

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1 HISTORY AND DOCTRINE . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 CRITERIA FORASSESSING SEAD EFFECTIVENESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 3 SERVICE APPROACHES TO SEAD . . . . . . .93 4 THE MERITS OF JSEAD: THE QUESTTO ACHIEVE EFFECTIVENESS . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 5 JSEAD: STRATEGY, TACTICS, AND THE CHANGED THREAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159 6 WHERE TO NEXT: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207...

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This study analyzes and assesses the changes in organization and structure of the active Air Force and ANG fighter maintenance units from the time the ANG became a separate reserve component in 1946 to the present-day organization, paralleling it with the active Air Force. It takes the reader from the ANG maintenance unit's beginning, through the changes that occurred over the years and the reason for the changes, to the present day organization. It then provides a glimpse at the future maintenance organization....

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1 AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE: PAST AND PRESENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .I Centralized Control, 1930-45 . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Period of Uncertainty, 1945-55 . . . . . . . . . . 5 Return to Centralization, 1955-70 . . . . . . . . 7 Decentralized Control, 1970 to the Present . .8 Lessons Learned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Current Organization Structure Theory : A Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12 Air Force and Major Command Policy Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 2 THE AIR NATIONAL GUARD MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION AND THE COMBAT ORIENTED MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION . . . . . . . . . . 23 The Centralized Organization . . . . . . . . . . .23 Strengths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Weaknesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25 The Decentralized Organization . . . . . . . . .26 Strengths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Weaknesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 The Air National Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...

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This study analyzes Gen O. P. Weyland’s impact on close air support (CAS) during the Korean War. First, the author briefly traces the history and evolution of air-ground support from its infancy to the start of the Korean War. Second, he shifts his focus to the effectiveness of CAS throughout the conflict and addresses why this mission was controversial for the Army and Air Force. Third, he highlights General Weyland’s perspective on tactical airpower and his role in the close-air-support “controversy.”...

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1 Close Air Support in 2006 . . . . . . . . .1 2 History and Evolution of Close Air Support: World War I to the Korean War . . . . . . . 5 3 Background on Gen O. P. Weyland . . . . 17 4 Close Air Support in Korea: The Controversy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 5 An Airman’s Perspective of Close Air Support in Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .81 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83...

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 THE INNOVATION IMPERATIVE . . . . . . . . . 3 THE ADVERSARIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 THE PLAN: 3 AUGUST 1990–15 JANUARY 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 CLASH OF ARMS: 17–26 JANUARY 1991 . . . .28 CENTAF ADAPTS: 27 JANUARY–5 FEBRUARY 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42 ATTRITION WAR: 6–23 FEBRUARY 1991 . . . 59 GROUND WAR: 24–28 FEBRUARY 1991 . . . .63 THE KEYS TO INNOVATION . . . . . . . . . . . 71 IMPLICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 Appendix A Primary USAF Units That Participated . . . 101 B Chronology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 C Location of Air Strikes during Desert Storm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 D Distribution of Strikes against RGFC Heavy Divisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 E Iraqi Prisoner of War Comment...

Description Details
Organizational change strategies for acquisition are essential due to the enormity of change required of the acquisition community. The Congress and the DOD have made many previous attempts at acquisition reform, but most have had little effect. To make sure our current reform efforts make positive, lasting changes, we must transform the acquisition culture. To date, little attention has been paid to cultural change aspects. To that end, this paper offers some ideas for organizations undergoing change for acquisition reform....

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix United States Air Force Vision . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Wright Brothers: Wilbur (1867–1912) and Orville (1871–1948) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 Col Edgar S. Gorrell (1891–1945) . . . . . . . . .8 Maj Gen William L. “Billy” Mitchell (1879–1936) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16 Col William C. Sherman (1888–1927) . . . . .22 Dr. Robert H. Goddard (1882–1945) . . . . . .28 Maj Gen Haywood Hansell, Jr. (1903–1988) 36 Gen Henry H. “Hap” Arnold (1886–1950) . . .42 Air Corps Tactical School (Acts) . . . . . . . . . .48 Lt Gen Harold L. “Hal” George (1893–1986) 52 Gen Muir S. Fairchild (1894–1950) . . . . . . .58 Brig Gen Kenneth N. Walker (1898–1943) . .64 Gen George C. Kenney (1889–1977) . . . . . 70 Gen Laurence S. Kuter (1905–1979) . . . . . .78 Maj Gen Claire L. Chennault (1890–1958) . .84 Gen Ira C. Eaker (1896–1987) . . . . . . . . . .92 Dr. Theodore von Kármán (1881–1963) . . .100...

Description Details
At first glance, strategic aerial reconnaissance appears to be a mere technical tool. The term refers to the use of aircraft to collect strategic intelligence using photographic or electronic means. According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), strategic intelligence refers to “intelligence that is required for the formation of policy and military plans at national and international levels.” Strategic intelligence includes information provided by sources other than aircraft, including naval vessels, ground communications intercept sites, satellites, published literature, defectors, and spies. Because Air Force aircraft provided the bulk of information used by American war plans from 1945 to 1953, this book focuses on the origins of the USAF strategic aerial reconnaissance. Although official JCS publications did not specifically list strategic aerial reconnaissance, the term may be defined as the use of aircraft to gather information necessary to conduct strategic air war, also called strategic air bombardment....

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1 THE ORIGINS OF STRATEGIC AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 2 GROPING IN THE DARK: RECONNAISSANCE BEFORE CONTAINMENT, 1945 –1946 . . . . . . 25 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42 3 FROM CONTAINMENT TO BERLIN: ORGANIZATIONAL STEPS TO FILL INTELLIGENCE GAPS, 1947–1948 . . . . . . . . 49 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 4 STRATEGIC BOMBING QUESTIONED: INTELLIGENCE SHORTFALLS AND WAR PLANS, 1949 –1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124 5 THE TEST: STRATEGIC RECONNAISSANCE IN KOREA, 1950 –1953 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161 6 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174...

Description Details
This work examines the historical development of aerial precision since World War I and the emergence of the just-war tradition and international law since 1625. It then identifies specific dilemmas associated with the two sorts of judgments required by the just-war tradition, namely, jus ad bellum (justice of war) and jus in bello (justice in war), and explores their ramifications. The aim of this study is to encourage moral and ethical reflection by politicians, strategists, and tacticians at all levels. The issues at hand are aerial precision doctrine, the use of the precision-guided munition as the modern aerial weapon of choice, and the influence of the just-war tradition on strategic and tactical decisions....

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1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 Aerial-Precision Development: Past, Present, and Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 3 Airpower and the Just-War Tradition . . . . .33 4 The Dilemmas of Perfect Aerial Precision . 49 5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63...

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In “The National Guard Citizen-Soldier,” Col Mark P. Meyer provides an excellent examination of the linkage between responsible national security policy and the will of the people. He argues that for our democratic government to act responsibly, it is imperative that national policy reflects the will of the people. It is especially important when the policy involves the use of the armed forces. In the United States, the National Guard and its citizen-soldiers are an essential part of the linkage. Without the existence and use of the National Guard, the nation treads dangerously toward inconsistency between the will of the people and national security policy....

Description Details
To help understand and begin to develop alternative policy frameworks that fit the current and emerging security context, the US Air Force’s Air Force Research Institute (AFRI), the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), and King’s College, London, hosted a two-day conference at the RUSI offices in London on 18 and 19 May 2009. We sought to bring together some of the best thinkers on deterrence to examine how to reinvigorate this essential tool for today’s policy community. The conference exceeded our expectations, as readers will observe from the excellent products in these proceedings. From the pre-conference “thought pieces” by RUSI’s Michael Codner and AFRI’s Adam Lowther—the presentations by the keynote speakers and case study developers—to the post-conference “Quick Looks” by AFRI personnel, the outcome reflects the creativity and the seriousness with which the attendees and the planning staffs approached the topic....

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1 Framing Deterrence in the Twenty-first Century: Conference Summary . . . . . . . 1 Adam Lowther 2 Defining “Deterrence” . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Michael Codner 3 Understanding Deterrence . . . . . . . .27 Adam Lowther 4 Policy and Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Gen Norton A Schwartz, USAF Lt Col Timothy R. Kirk, USAF 5 Waging Deterrence in the Twenty-first Century . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 Gen Kevin Chilton, USAF Greg Weaver 6 On Nuclear Deterrence and Assurance . . 77 Keith B. Payne 7 Conference Agenda . . . . . . . . . . 121 8 Contemporary Challenges for Extended Deterrence . . . . . . . . . . . . .  123 Tom Scheber 9 Case Study—The August 2008 War between Russia and Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141 Denis Corboy 10 Deterrence and Counterproliferation . . 149 Malcolm Chalmers 11 Deterrence and Saddam Hussein . . . 155 Barry Schneider 12 Stymieing Leviathan . . . . . . . . . 215 Paul Schulte 13 The Madrid Train Bombing . . . . . . .237 Peter Neumann 14 Framing Strategic Deterrence . . . . . . ...

Description Details
The purpose of this study is to identify criteria that will provide objective analysis of a halt-phase strategy. This study identifies the key criteria by examining air combat in three operations: the Battle of Bismarck Sea, the 1973 Golan Heights battles of the Yom Kippur War, and the Iraqi Republican Guard escape from Basra. This examination focuses on air operations looking for tactics, tactical innovations, and operational circumstances that inhibit or enhance air operations designed to halt the advance or retreat of significant ground formations. This study evaluates each case in three major phases: prehostility preparation, conduct of combat operations, and the results and analysis of the operation....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . 3 2 EXPLANATION OF THE HALT–PHASE STRATEGY . . 5 Notes . . . . . . 13 3 CRITIQUES OF THE HALT–PHASE STRATEGY . . 15 Notes . . . . . . 22 4 THE BATTLE OF THE BISMARCK SEA . . 25 Notes . . . . . . 34 5 1973 YOM KIPPUR WAR, GOLAN HEIGHTS ACTION . . 37 Notes . . . . . . 47 6 THE IRAQI REPUBLICAN GUARD BASRA ESCAPE . . . 49 Notes . . . . . . 63 7 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . 65 Notes . . . . . . 72...

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1 THE ROLE OF DOCTRINE . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 THE DOCTRINAL PROCESS: SOME SUGGESTED STEPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 3 CONCEPTS, DOCTRINES, PRINCIPLES . . . .19 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 4 SOME SEMINAL THINKERS ON TECHNOLOGY AND DOCTRINE . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 5 WEAPONS AND DOCTRINE: A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 6 INSIGHTS ON TECHNOLOGY AND DOCTRINE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .79 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 7 OF SABER CHARGES, ESCORT FIGHTERS, AND SPACECRAFT: THE SEARCH FOR DOCTRINE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .91 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 8 LOOKING BACKWARD TO SEE AHEAD IN SPACE: REFLECTIONS ON THE NEED FOR SPACE DOCTRINE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .109 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 9 A MO...

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A MATTER OF DOCTRINE.............................1 Definitions................................................ 1 Direction.................................................. 3 Notes....................................................... 7 2 THE HISTORIC PRECEDENT: A REQUIREMENT FOR FLEXIBILITY........................................ 9 The Lessons of War.................................... 9 The Nuclear Imperative............................. 15 Notes.................................................. 21 3 THE EFFECT OF TECHNOLOGY.................. 25 Real Smarts in Small Packages .................26 Near Nukes and Real Nukes .......................32 Space: Star Wars in Context .....................40 Notes.................................................. 47 4 APPLYING THE LESSONS: CHANGING AEROSPACE DOCTRINE.............................. 51 The Importance of Actions .........................52 The Global Perspective.............................. 57 Proposals for the Future: A Doctrinal Synthesis...............................................59 The Falklands: A Global Scenario..............64 Notes....................

Description Details
Wills argues that the twentieth-century argument between air and ground proponents has changed significantly since the Gulf War, and it comes down to the relative importance of the ground or air in the mix. It is more than just using air as a supporting component to the ground forces—if this is true, current force organization and employment is adequate. However, if the air predominates in combat operations, then, as Wills puts it in his first chapter, joint operations doctrine needs to be rethought. A changed balance “will affect the military at every level . . . force structure, organization, weapons acquisition, doctrine, and training” (p. 3). Notwithstanding the blunt commentary from ground proponents, Wills offers that airpower has come to dominate air/ground relations....

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1 FRAMING THE DEBATE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2 AIRPOWER, WAR, AND DIPLOMACY . . . . . 9 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16 3 ASSESSING THE AIR/GROUND RELATIONSHIP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30 4 THE AFGHAN MODEL AND BEYOND . . . . . .35 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .52 5 IMPLICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69...

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1 THE NATURE OF THE BEAST . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 2 MANEUVER WARFARE IN ACTION-EARLY GERMAN CAMPAIGNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 3 MANEUVER WARFARE IN ACTION-THE GERMAN 1941 CAMPAIGN IN RUSSIA . . . . . .61 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 PHOTO SECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 4 MANEUVER WARFARE IN ACTION-THE SOVIET VERSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148 5 ISRAEL: MANEUVER WARFARE, AIR POWER, AND LOGISTICS . . . . . . . . . . . . .153 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189 6 MANEUVER WARFARE AND AIR POWER IN THE 1990s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .193 Past Limitations on Air Power . . . . . . . . . .193 Air Power and New Developments . . . . . . . 196 Hardware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .197 Situational . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .198 The Cordon Sanitaire of Reconstruction . . .200 Differences in ...

Description Details
This thesis explores the evolution of Russian military doctrine in light of the lessons they say they learned from the Gulf War. Since the early 1980s, such prominent military thinkers as Marshal of the Soviet Union N. V. Ogarkov argued that emerging technologies were generating a new revolution in military affairs. The Russian military doctrinal response to Desert Storm seems to confirm Marshal Ogarkov’s predictions. This thesis finds the new military doctrine (1) reverts from the defensive to an offensive preemption, (2) reverts from no nuclear first use to nuclear escalation, (3) guarantees ethnic Russians living in former Soviet states protection, (4) emphasizes the importance of military advancement in C4I, smart weapons, and mobility, and (5) emphasizes strategic nonnuclear deterrent forces....

Table of Contents Details
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . 4 2 RUSSIAN VIEW OF MILITARY DOCTRINE . . . . 7 Relationship between Military Doctrine and Strategy . . . . 8 Military Doctrine—Military Art—Operational Art—Tactics . . . .9 Soviet/Russian Military Doctrine Evolution . . . . 9 Soviet Military Doctrine Stereotype . . . . . 16 Notes . . . . . . 19 3 RUSSIAN IMPRESSION OF THE GULF WAR . . . . . . 23 Strategy . . . . . 24 The Threat . . . . . . 25 Future War . . . . . . 25 The Initial Period of War . . . . . 27 Operational Art . . . . 28 Force Structure . . . . 31 Tactics . . . . . . 32 Technology, Research, and Development . . . . . 33 Summary . . . . 34 Notes . . . . . . 35 4 EMERGING RUSSIAN POST–GULF WAR MILITARY DOCTRINE . . . . 39 The Threat . . . . . . 41 View of Future War . . . . . 42 Force Structure and Priorities . . . . . 42 Differences with Pre–Gulf War Military Doctrine . . . . . . 43 Conclusions . . . . . . 44 Notes . . . . . . 45 5 IMPLICATIONS FOR US STRATEGISTS . . . . . . 47 Notes . . . . . . 52...

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The purpose of this paper is to recommend that the United States government maintain the defense technological and industrial base (DTIB) by aggressively supporting the US defense industry in the arms transfer process. Ironically, this recommendation is contrary to the position held at the onset of this research and analysis effort. To accomplish this purpose, this paper has three aims. First, it recognizes that the DTIB requires preservation. Second, it describes arms transfers as an instrument of foreign policy based on US national security interests and the foreign policy challenges of the day. Third, it focuses on the current arms transfer decision-making process and represents it as a “Labyrinth of Control.” This section of the paper demonstrates the maze of controls used to adequately ensure that US military technologies are not diffused to foreign nations....

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PRESERVING THE DEFENSE TECHNOLOGICAL AND INDUSTRIAL BASE . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . 6 ARMS TRANSFERS AS AN INSTRUMENT OF US FOREIGN POLICY . . . . . 7 Notes . . . . . 14 THE LABYRINTH OF CONTROL . . . . . 17 Notes . . . . . 27 MAINTAINING THE DTIB WITH US GOVERNMENT SUPPORT . . . . 29 Notes . . . . . 34 GLOSSARY . . . . . 35 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 37...

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This compelling study by Lt Col Lawrence E. Key examines how national will plays a decisive role during any application of US military power and not just the employment of forces to fight America’s wars. Because of the decisive role national will plays, leaders need to understand what it is and, beyond its definition, the ways in which they can articulate and cultivate it. To gain this understanding, leaders must look at various means by which the American public expresses its collective will; the most important means being public opinion. However, the author argues that only mature collective opinion can represent national will....

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ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSE THROUGH WORLD WAR II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 British Antiaircraft Artillery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 The V-1 Campaign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 American Antiaircraft Artillery . . . . . . . . . . . 22 German Flak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Allied Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Fratricide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .46 The US Navy in the Pacific . . . . . . . . . . . . .49 Japanese Antiaircraft Artillery . . . . . . . . . . .53 The Lessons of World War II . . . . . . . . . . .57 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 2 FROM GUNS TO MISSILES, 1945–1965 . . .69 Antiaircraft Returns to Combat: The Korean War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75 Antiaircraft Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .81 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 3 AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS: VIETNAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .113 French Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 America Enters the War . . . . . . . . . . . . . .114...

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I developed this thesis because I perceived a void in applying these themes—technology, force reductions, and futuristic visions—to command and control and to related impacts for staff structures. I seek concrete application of these ideas, rather than more rhetoric on what might be . . . someday. This paper represents my effort to peer into our future and see possibilities....

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In Thinking Effects: Effects-Based Methodology for Joint Operations, the authors propose that military actions should be employed through effects-based operations (EBO). Submitting that this methodology is extremely promising, they recognize two major areas of challenge. First, is modifying both service and joint doctrine to fully articulate what can be accomplished with EBO. Second, there are major issues in the area of command and control (C2). Effective C2 for EBO depends on how intelligence analysis and combat assessment not only are performed but also integrated into the planning process....

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INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 TIME FOR A NEW PARADIGM? . . . . . . . . . . . .4 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON EFFECTS . . . 17 CONCEPTUAL BASIS FOR EFFECTS . . . . . . . 29 A GENERAL THEORY OF JOINT EFFECTS BASED OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 AN IDEALIZED JOINT EBO PROCESS . . . . . . .55 WHAT ARE THE MAJOR CHALLENGES IN IMPLEMENTING THE EBO METHODOLOGY?. . .77 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .87 NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 TERMS AND DEFINITIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . .95...

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The analysts were charged with the task of anticipating which specific contentious issues likely will propel large, organized political units to choose violent means of acquiring their sociopolitical objectives rather than attaining them peacefully. The units on which we focus have been traditionally identified as states, but we recognize that a host of new sub- and suprastate actors also will play major roles in such wars; hence, we also will allude to them....

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DISCLAIMER...............................................ii PREFACE....................................................vi HISTORY, CULTURE, AND CHANGE: FOUNDATIONS OF CONFLICTS AND WARS......1 RELIGION-A BANNER FOR TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY CONFLICT............................19 NATIONAL FRAGMENTATION, ETHNICITY, AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER............................32 POPULATION PRESSURES, MIGRATION, AND REFUGEES...................................46 TRANSNATIONAL CRIME ITS EFFECT AND IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL STABILITY..............................................58 HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS............................................70 ANTICIPATING THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ECONOMIC SOURCES OF CONFLICTS..........82 THE THIRD WORLD’S NONVIABLE STATES A MAJOR SOURCE OF CONFLICT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY...........................96 Table 2..................................................101 WHEN THE WATER RUNS OUT......................................................111 TRANSNATIONAL AIR, WATER, AND LAND DEGRADATION PROBLEMS.............................................124 NUCLEAR CONFLICT AND NONPROLIFERATIO...